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ABSTRACT 
  In the fall of 2010, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced a bill that 
would have overridden a New Deal-era federal statute forbidding 
retired Justices from serving by designation on the Supreme Court of 
the United States. The Leahy bill would have authorized the Court to 
recall willing retired Justices to substitute for recused Justices. This 
Article uses the Leahy bill as a springboard for considering a number 
of important constitutional and policy questions, including whether 
the possibility of 4–4 splits justifies the substitution of a retired Justice 
for an active one; whether permitting retired Justices to substitute for 
recused Justices would violate Article III’s requirement that there be 
“one supreme Court”; and whether the ethical limitations on 
extrajudicial activities should be the same for active and retired judges 
and Justices. In addition to relying on published material, we draw on 
information gleaned from our interview with retired Justice Stevens, 
who was the original source of the Leahy proposal. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In her first term as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, Elena Kagan recused herself from roughly one-
third of the cases on the Court’s docket.1 Although Justices do not 
typically divulge their grounds for recusing,2 the reason for all of 
these recusals was obvious: Kagan believed that her participation in 
various aspects of these cases in her former role as solicitor general 
created at least the appearance of impropriety.3 Kagan perhaps could 
have taken a narrower view and recused herself in fewer cases; 
 1. During the 2010 term, Justice Kagan recused herself from twenty-eight cases. October 
Term 2010, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/terms/ot2010 (last visited Sept. 
5, 2011); Nina Totenberg, The Robe Seems To Suit New Justice Kagan, NPR (Dec. 27, 2010), 
http://www.npr.org/2010/12/27/132109642/the-robe-seems-to-suit-new-justice-kagan. The Court 
heard eighty-two merits cases in the October 2010 Term. Stat Pack for October Term 2010, 
SCOTUSBLOG, 1 (June 28, 2011), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/
SB_OT10_stat_pack_final.pdf. 
 2. But cf. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (order denying 
motion to recuse) (discussing the grounds for the request of his own recusal but ultimately 
denying the motion). 
 3. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Recusals Could Force Newest Justice To Miss Many Cases, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2010, at A15 (“Kagan is recusing herself from cases in which she had a role 
in drafting a brief for the Supreme Court, or when she was actively involved in a case in the 
lower courts.”). 
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nevertheless, once the deed was done, the Court was left 
shorthanded. 
Into the breach stepped Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee Patrick Leahy, who introduced a bill4 that would lift a 
New Deal-era prohibition on retired Supreme Court Justices sitting 
by designation on the high court.5 Under the Leahy proposal, a 
majority of the active Justices would have been able to designate a 
retired Justice to substitute for a recused Justice.6 The proposal 
seemed especially timely in autumn 20107 because there were—and as 
 4. Senator Patrick Leahy’s September 29, 2010, bill was simple in its concept and its 
language: “To amend chapter 13 of title 28, United States Code, to authorize the designation 
and assignment of retired justices of the Supreme Court to particular cases in which an active 
justice is recused.” S. 3871, 111th Cong. pmbl. (2010). In other words, in any Supreme Court 
case in which a sitting Justice was recused, a retired Supreme Court Justice could be tapped to 
take her place in deciding the case. The September 29 bill read as follows: 
  Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. DESIGNATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RETIRED  
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES. 
Section 294 of title 28, United States Code, is amended— 
  (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ‘‘(1)’’ after ‘‘(a)’’; 
  (2) by adding at the end the following:  
‘‘(2) Any retired Chief Justice of the United States or any retired Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court may be designated and assigned to serve as a justice on the 
Supreme Court of the United States in a particular case if— 
‘‘(A) any active justice is recused from that case; and 
‘‘(B) a majority of active justices vote to designate and assign that retired Chief 
Justice or Associate Justice.’’; and 
(3) in subsection (d), by striking ‘‘No such designation or assignment shall be 
made to the Supreme Court.’’ and inserting ‘‘Except as provided under subsection 
(a)(2), no designation or assignment under this section shall be made to the 
Supreme Court.’’ 
Id. sec. 1. 
 5. 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (2006) (“No . . . designation or assignment [of retired judges or 
Justices] shall be made to the Supreme Court.”). 
 6. S. 3871 sec. 1, § 2. 
 7. Senator Leahy introduced this bill on September 29, 2010. On November 8, 2010, the 
authors spoke for approximately twenty minutes by telephone conference call with Justice 
Stevens, who was in his chambers in Washington, D.C. We did not record the conversation, but 
each of us took detailed notes. Justice Stevens told us that he and then-Chief Justice Rehnquist 
had the idea several years ago to enlist retired Justices as substitutes for recused Justices, but 
were unable to persuade their colleagues to seek legislation authorizing the proposal. Following 
his decision to retire, Justice Stevens met with Senator Leahy, who asked him if he had any 
ideas for the improvement of the Court’s operations. At that point, Justice Stevens suggested 
that retired Justices could be enlisted to serve as substitutes for recused Justices. Telephone 
Interview with John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice (retired), Supreme Court of the U.S. (Nov. 8, 
2010) (notes on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
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this Article goes to press, continue to be—three retired Justices in 
good mental and physical condition.8 
Adoption of the Leahy bill could avoid some 4–4 split decisions,9 
but it answers no pressing need. Indeed, as we explain, implementing 
the proposal would raise a substantial number of questions of policy, 
administrability, and constitutionality. Accordingly, we do not 
endorse the Leahy bill. 
Nonetheless, we are sympathetic to the spirit of the Leahy 
proposal because retired Justices currently represent a valuable and 
underutilized human resource. The Leahy proposal thus raises the 
broader question of how retired Justices who wish to remain active in 
public life may do so consistently with judicial ethics and 
constitutional constraints. Furthermore, in seeking to draw on the 
experience and expertise of retired Justices, the Leahy proposal and 
the others that we discuss in this Article present an opportunity to 
explore questions about the nature of the office held by active 
Supreme Court Justices, no less than retired ones. 
This Article uses the Leahy proposal to frame discussion of the 
foregoing issues. Part I briefly recounts the history of retirements 
from the Court. Part II canvasses the costs and benefits of asking 
retired Justices to participate in a substitution system. Part III 
considers constitutional objections to the Leahy bill. Part IV 
considers other roles that in the past have been, and in the future 
could be, assigned to willing retired Justices. The Article concludes by 
arguing for broad utilization of the services of retired Justices. 
I.  RETIRED JUSTICES THROUGHOUT HISTORY AND TODAY 
The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the 
twenty-first century brought many changes to the American judicial 
system, but one largely overlooked development was the survival of 
retired Supreme Court Justices, most of them able-bodied and 
 8. The retired Justices are Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and Souter. 
 9. As discussed in Part II.C, infra, according to longstanding tradition, 4–4 splits do not 
create precedent but instead simply result in the lower court decision’s being affirmed. Durant 
v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 112 (1868); see also Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme 
Court of the United States, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 646 (2002) (“The traditional practice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States is that ‘no affirmative action can be had in a cause 
where the judges are equally divided in opinion as to the judgment to be rendered or order to be 
made.’” (quoting Durant, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 110)). 
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mentally sharp.10 Over the course of American history, most Supreme 
Court Justices “remain[ed] on the court until they died (the exit 
strategy of 49 of the 103 Justices not currently serving) or became 
enfeebled by age (recall the explanation that Justice Thurgood 
Marshall gave when he retired in 1991 at the age of 83: ‘I’m old and 
falling apart.’).”11 Indeed, before the 1990s, it was not unusual for a 
Justice to retire when no other retired Justice was living and 
competent.12 And before 1937, when Congress passed the Retirement 
Act, retirement was not even possible; resignation was the only 
available option.13 
In the 1990s, however, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, 
White, and Blackmun were simultaneously alive and in reasonably 
 10. A significant exception was Justice Thurgood Marshall. See infra text accompanying 
note 11. 
 11. Linda Greenhouse, Justice Unbound, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Dec. 2, 2010, 9:44 
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/02/justice-unbound. In large part, the 
reluctance to retire came about because “resigned” Justices did not receive pensions. Indeed, 
historically, even Justices enfeebled by age remained on the Court so that they could continue 
to draw a salary, even when they were no longer physically or mentally capable of performing 
the job. For example, Edward Bates, attorney general under Abraham Lincoln, wrote on April 
11, 1864, that four Supreme Court Justices—Chief Justice Taney and Associate Justices Catron, 
Grier, and Wayne—wanted to retire but were unable to do so because Congress had not passed 
a pension bill and their salaries were their sole means of support. THE DIARY OF EDWARD 
BATES 1859–1866, at 358 (Howard K. Beale ed., 1933). Chief Justice Taney died that year and 
left his orphaned daughters a tiny estate. Ross E. Davies, The Judiciary Fund: A Modest 
Proposal That the Bar Give to Judges What Congress Will Not Let Them Earn, 11 GREEN BAG 
2D 357, 359 (2008). Seven years later, his children were in such dire circumstances that the 
Supreme Court petitioned to set up a fund on their behalf. Id. Meanwhile, the Judiciary Act of 
1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44, provided living Justices who had reached the age of seventy and who 
had served for at least ten years with a lifetime pension of their yearly salary as of the date of 
their retirement. Id. § 5. A comprehensive study of Article III judges shows that pension 
eligibility plays a crucial role in the timing of the decision to resign, retire, or take senior status. 
See Albert Yoon, Pensions, Politics, and Judicial Tenure: An Empirical Study of Federal Judges, 
1869–2002, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 143, 145 (2006) (“The key empirical finding of this article 
identifies pensions . . . as the primary determinant of judicial turnover.”). Although the study 
finds that Supreme Court Justices—unlike district and circuit court judges—do not synchronize 
their decisions to cease active service with pension eligibility, id., that finding hardly casts doubt 
on the proposition that the ability to receive any payment whatsoever influences the decision of 
a Justice to step down before death or enfeeblement. 
 12. See DAVID N. ATKINSON, LEAVING THE BENCH: SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AT THE 
END 104–54 (1999) (describing the retirements, resignations, and deaths of Justices from 1937 
through 1987). 
 13. See Act of Mar. 1, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-870, 45 Stat. 1422 (repealed 1937) (allowing 
Supreme Court Justices to resign but not retire). In Part III, infra, we discuss the differences 
between resignation and retirement. See infra text accompanying notes 94–99. 
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good health for at least part of their retirements.14 Between 2005 and 
2010, Justices O’Connor,15 Souter, and Stevens retired from their 
positions on the Court, all before their health or mental competence 
required them to do so.16 Even though modern Justices often serve 
longer than their historical counterparts,17 it may not come as a 
surprise that they find themselves ready to retire after twenty,18 
twenty-five,19 or even thirty-five20 years in their demanding roles on 
the Court. 
Indeed, as Professor David Atkinson notes, Justices have 
historically retired for one or more of eight reasons: “(1) the threat of 
impeachment; (2) an attractive pension; (3) ambition; 
(4) dissatisfaction or weariness; (5) poor health or declining physical 
energy; (6) mental decline or disability; (7) family pressure; and (8) a 
 14. As the previous quotation indicates, see supra text accompanying note 11, Justice 
Marshall was retired and still living from 1991 to 1993, but he was in very poor health, and his 
physical condition predicated his retirement. 
 15. Justice O’Connor announced her intended retirement in July 2005, but she did not 
actually retire until the confirmation and investiture of her successor, Justice Alito, in January 
2006. President George W. Bush had originally chosen John G. Roberts, Jr., to replace 
O’Connor. Upon Chief Justice Rehnquist’s death, the president withdrew his nomination of 
Roberts for Associate Justice to appoint him to be Chief Justice. David D. Kirkpatrick, Alito 
Sworn In as Justice After Senate Gives Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A21; see also R. 
SAM GARRETT & DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33118, SPEED OF 
PRESIDENTIAL AND SENATE ACTIONS ON SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS, 1900–2010, at 4–7 
(2010) (discussing the nomination processes of Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts). 
 16. According to news and self-reports, Justice O’Connor retired primarily to care for her 
husband, who had Alzheimer’s disease. Richard W. Stevenson, O’Connor To Retire, Touching 
Off Battle over Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at A1. Justice Souter retired primarily to return 
to his native New Hampshire. Peter Baker & Jeff Zeleny, Souter’s Exit To Give Obama First 
Opening, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2009, at A1. Justice Stevens apparently retired simply because, 
having served on the Court longer than all but two other Justices in American history, he 
wished to spend his remaining years engaged in other pursuits. Ross E. Davies, Craig D. Rust & 
Adam Aft, Supreme Court Sluggers: John Paul Stevens Is No Stephen J. Field, 13 GREEN BAG 
2D 465, 465 (2010). 
 17. ATKINSON, supra note 12, at 188–89. 
 18. David Souter received his Associate Justice commission on October 3, 1990, and 
assumed senior status on June 30, 2009. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Souter, David 
Hackett, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2244&cid=999&ctype=
na&instate=na (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). 
 19. Sandra Day O’Connor received her Associate Justice commission on September 22, 
1981, and assumed senior status on January 31, 2006. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: 
O’Connor, Sandra Day, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1796&cid
=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). 
 20. John Paul Stevens received his Associate Justice commission on December 17, 1975, 
and assumed senior status on June 30, 2010. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Stevens, 
John Paul, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2290&cid=999&ctype
=na&instate=na (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). 
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voluntary choice even though they remain capable of doing the 
work.”21 And regardless of the reason a Justice chooses to retire, 
“early”22 retirement is made easier by the statutory pension scheme 
set out for retired Justices. Justices who retire under the “rule of 
eighty”23 may collect whatever their full salary was at the time of their 
retirement.24 Justices who wish to continue to serve on the lower 
federal courts are entitled to subsequently enacted judicial pay raises, 
if they occur.25 
But when relatively young and healthy, even vigorous, Justices 
retire, they do not typically sit idly by and watch as the world marches 
on without them. Justices who have retired since the 1960s have 
tended to engage in a wide range of activities: They give interviews 
and speeches;26 they teach law students and other adults;27 they chair 
 21. ATKINSON, supra note 12, at 1. On the other hand, Atkinson posits that there have also 
been eight reasons why Justices decline to retire voluntarily over the years: “(1) financial 
considerations; (2) party or ideology; (3) a determination to stay; (4) a sense of indispensability; 
(5) loss of status; (6) a belief they can still do the work; (7) not knowing what else to do; 
(8) family pressure to stay in office.” Id. at 8 (noting that some of these reasons, such as 
financial considerations and feeling at a loss for how to occupy time, are no longer serious 
concerns). With respect to Atkinson’s second factor, there is certainly anecdotal evidence of 
Justices timing their retirement to coincide with the term of a president thought likely to name a 
successor who shared the retiring Justice’s jurisprudential views. Retiring Justices, however, 
tend to deny such motivation. Cf. Anthony Lewis, Op-Ed., The Blackmun Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 8, 1994, at A27 (reporting a statement by Justice Blackmun urging President Clinton not to 
“use a litmus test . . . but just [to] pick good judges” (omission in original)). Whatever one 
makes of individual examples, there is little statistical evidence of judges and Justices timing 
their retirements based on the expected ideology of their successors. See Yoon, supra note 11, at 
145 (“[T]he rates at which federal judges—at all levels—leave active status are largely 
unaffected by either political or institutional environment . . . .”). 
 22. Of course, a person who retires at age ninety, as Justice Stevens did, could hardly be 
said to be taking early retirement in any other profession. As noted, however, over the course of 
Supreme Court history, Justices have rarely retired before they were forced to do so by 
declining health. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 23. 28 U.S.C. § 371(c) (2006); see also Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. COURTS, http://
www.uscourts.gov/Common/FAQS.aspx (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (“Beginning at age 65, a 
judge may retire at his or her current salary or take senior status after performing 15 years of 
active service as an Article III judge (65+15 = 80). A sliding scale of increasing age and 
decreasing service results in eligibility for retirement compensation at age 70 with a minimum of 
10 years of service (70+10=80). Senior judges, who essentially provide volunteer service to the 
courts, typically handle about 15 percent of the federal courts’ workload annually.”). By its 
language, this statute expressly applies to Justices, as well as judges on the lower federal courts. 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 371(a). 
 25. To be eligible for judicial pay raises, retired Justices must annually perform at least the 
same amount of work that an active judge would perform in three months, or other work for the 
courts as specified in detail under the statutory scheme. Id. § 371(e). 
 26. For example, Justice O’Connor interviewed Justice Stevens in Newsweek at the end of 
2010. Sandra Day O’Connor Interviews John Paul Stevens, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 27, 2010/Jan. 3, 
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or otherwise serve on commissions;28 they speak out on issues related 
to the judiciary and beyond;29 and they sit by designation on the lower 
federal courts. One retired Justice even acted in a Hollywood movie, 
portraying, as might be expected, a famous Justice from history.30 
2011, at 38. Justice Souter gave the 2010 Harvard commencement speech. Linda Greenhouse, 
Justice Souter’s Class, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (June 3, 2010, 9:47 PM), http://opinionator.
blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/03/justice-souters-class. Justice O’Connor speaks extensively on 
judicial independence and sponsors an effort to spur civics education. See The Sandra Day 
O’Connor Project on the State of the Judiciary Has Concluded, GEORGETOWN LAW, http://www.
law.georgetown.edu/judiciary (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (detailing some of Justice O’Connor’s 
activities); see also ICIVICS, http://www.icivics.org (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (game-playing civics 
site envisioned by O’Connor). 
 27. For example, retired Justice Stewart taught a class for Paul Gewirtz, Potter Stewart 
Professor of Constitutional Law at Yale Law School. Professor Gewirtz recalled: 
After the Justice retired from the Court, and I had started teaching at Yale, I invited 
him to visit his old law school and teach a class in my course on “Antidiscrimination 
Law.” He came and taught a controversial affirmative action case in which he had 
recently dissented, and was a great success. 
Paul Gewirtz, Essay, On “I Know It When I See It,” 105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1023 n.† (1996). Justice 
O’Connor is listed as a faculty member at the law school that carries her name at Arizona State 
University. Faculty Index, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR COLL. OF LAW, http://apps.law.asu.edu/
Apps/Faculty/FacultyIndex.aspx (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). During the summer of 2010, Justice 
O’Connor participated in a University of Virginia Semester at Sea conference, which took place 
on a cruise from Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, to Halifax, Nova Scotia. Forum on Global Engagement 
To Feature Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Activist/Historian Julian Bond, SEMESTER AT SEA 
(June 2, 2010), http://www.semesteratsea.org/what-s-new-at-sas-/press-releases/forum-on-global-
engagement-to-feature-justice-sandra-o-connor-and-activist/historian-julian-bond.php. 
 28. For example, Chief Justice Burger chaired the U.S. Constitution Bicentennial 
Commission, Charles N. Quigley, Civic Education: Recent History, Current Status, and the 
Future, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1425, 1447 (1999); Justice White chaired the Commission on Structural 
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Cathy Catterson, Changes in Appellate 
Caseload and Its Processing, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 287, 288 (2006); and Justice O’Connor sat on the 
Iraq Study Group, David E. Sanger, G.O.P.’s Baker Hints Iraq Plan Needs Change, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 9, 2006, at A1. 
 29. Chief Justice Warren worked with the group World Peace Through Law in his 
retirement. He also spoke against the creation of a National Court of Appeals. JIM NEWTON, 
JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE 508–10 (2006). Justice 
O’Connor has not minced words over her feelings on judicial elections. James Podgers, 
O’Connor on Judicial Elections: ‘They’re Awful. I Hate Them,’ A.B.A. J. (May 9, 2009, 8:09 AM 
CDT), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/oconnor_chemerinsky_sound_warnings_at_aba_
conference_about_the_dangers_of_s. And, according to one judge who has been extremely 
active since taking senior status roughly a quarter-century ago, retired judges should write more 
than they do. See Ruggero J. Aldisert, All Right, Retired Judges, Write!, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 227, 228 (2006) (“And this is the recommendation that I make for every retired 
judge—trial or appellate, state or federal: Make yourselves heard on scholarly issues.”). 
 30. Justice Blackmun appeared as Justice Story in the Steven Spielberg film AMISTAD 
(DreamWorks SKG 1997). TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, HARRY A. BLACKMUN: THE OUTSIDER 
JUSTICE 330–33 (2008). 
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Retired Justices have notably been absent, however, from an 
obvious form of service, one that retired federal district and circuit 
court judges routinely perform: sitting by designation on their own 
Court—that is, the Supreme Court—when it is shorthanded. The 
reason for their absence—the lack of statutory authority for them to 
sit on the Court after retirement, even in special circumstances—has 
been the object of several reform proposals over the years, most 
notably the Leahy bill.31 
Seen from one perspective, any proposal to lengthen the period 
of service of Supreme Court Justices swims against the tide. 
Politicians and scholars have sought to impose term or age limits on 
Supreme Court Justices, either through constitutional amendment32 
or, more controversially, by statute.33 These proposals aim to remedy 
overpoliticization,34 “mental decrepitude,”35 ossification, excessive 
 31. Several bills authorizing the recall of Supreme Court Justices were introduced in the 
78th Congress (1943–1944) after a small handful of Supreme Court cases were dismissed for lack 
of a quorum. See H.E. Cunningham, Editorial Note, The Problem of the Supreme Court 
Quorum, 12 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 185–89 (1944) (discussing several such proposals). The 
possibility was also discussed in 1954 when Congress considered several resolutions proposing 
constitutional amendments to change the composition and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
See generally Composition and Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Hearing on S.J. Res. 44 Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. 27 (1954); Composition and Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court: Hearing on S.J. Res. 44, H.R.J. Res. 194, H.R.J. Res. 27 & H.R.J. Res. 91 Before 
Subcomm. No. 4 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. 26 (1954). 
 32. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: 
Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 824 (2006) (“We propose 
that . . . Congress and the states should pass a constitutional amendment imposing an eighteen-
year, staggered term limit on the tenure of Supreme Court Justices.”); David J. Garrow, Mental 
Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Co[u]rt: The Historical Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 995, 1034–41 (2000) (detailing, among other proposals, Senator Butler’s push for a 
constitutional amendment mandating that Justices retire at age 75). 
 33. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, The Supreme Court Renewal Act: A 
Return to Basic Principles, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES 467, 471 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006) (“One Justice or Chief 
Justice, and only one, shall be appointed during the first session of Congress after each federal 
election . . . . If an appointment under this Subsection results in the availability of more than 
nine Justices, the nine who are junior in commission shall sit regularly on the Court.”). But see 
Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 32, at 855–68 (arguing that such a statute would be 
unconstitutional). 
 34. See Akhil Reed Amar & Steven G. Calabresi, Term Limits for the High Court, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 9, 2002, at A23 (“Currently each justice is tempted to time his or her departure with 
one eye on the political calendar and one finger in the political wind. . . . Perverse incentives 
also exist at the other end of the age spectrum: Life tenure encourages presidents to nominate 
young candidates with minimal paper trails and maximal potential to shape the future.”). 
 35. ARTEMUS WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE: THE POLITICS OF RETIREMENT FROM THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 240 (2003). 
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countermajoritarianism, and other perceived ills that purportedly 
result from life tenure.36 
We take no position here on the wisdom of life tenure or on the 
constitutionality of those proposals that would restrict it without a 
formal constitutional amendment. Instead, we assume that life tenure 
will remain for the foreseeable future, and, given that fact, we ask 
what roles retired Justices can fruitfully play, including whether they 
might constitutionally and practically serve by designation on their 
own Court after retirement from active service. 
II.  THE “PROBLEM” AND POTENTIAL SOLUTION 
A. Background: The “Rehnquist/Stevens” Proposal 
As time passes, the case for the Leahy bill loses strength. Soon, 
the cases on which Justice Kagan worked as solicitor general will all 
have worked their way through the system, and the number of 
recusals will revert to its usual handful per term. Still, the issue may 
well arise again. 
Indeed, the history of the current proposal illustrates the 
recurring nature of the underlying problem. When we interviewed 
retired Justice Stevens on the subject, he told us that many years 
earlier he and then-Chief Justice Rehnquist had originally conceived 
of what became the Leahy bill, but at the time they were unable to 
persuade any of their colleagues to ask Congress for authorizing 
legislation.37 Upon retiring, Justice Stevens attempted to revive the 
idea by suggesting it to Senator Leahy.38 
 36. See id. at 240–47 (noting that the “debate about life tenure” is “longstanding” and 
describing several past proposals to limit the tenure of the Justices). 
 37. Telephone Interview with John Paul Stevens, supra note 7; see also HARRY A. 
BLACKMUN AS INTERVIEWED BY HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
ORAL HISTORY PROJECT 352 (1997), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/blackmun-public/
page.html?FOLDERID=D0901&SERIESID=D09 (“During that term—it might have been 
during the ‘86 term—Justice Stevens suggested that Congress should be asked to legislate to 
provide for a retired justice to sit in place in a vacancy that happened for a particular case. If a 
justice was recused or ill or the Court was reduced to eight for a period, the legislation would 
have enabled a retired justice to fill the vacancy so that there were always nine on a case. The 
Court did not support this. I’m not sure I know the reasons why. In any event, Congress did not 
enact it.”); Letter from John Paul Stevens to William H. Rehnquist (Oct. 28, 1998), in WARD, 
supra note 35, app. C at 255–57 (continuing a prior oral discussion about “the possibility of 
requesting Congress to enact legislation authorizing [the Court] to invite a retired justice to sit 
[on the Court] on cases in which [they] do not have a full Court”). 
 38. Telephone Interview with John Paul Stevens, supra note 7. 
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The primary motive of Justice Stevens and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist was to avoid 4–4 vote splits,39 and the timing of the Leahy 
proposal strongly suggests that Senator Leahy had the same intent. 
We would define the “retired Justices problem” more broadly. In 
fact, as explained in Section C, the 4–4 split may not be a real 
problem. But even if the original reasons for the proposal do not 
themselves warrant a change, there may well be other significant 
benefits from permitting retired Justices to serve on the Court as 
substitutes for recused Justices. 
Retired Justices are a valuable human resource—however small 
and elite the group making up that resource might be—and one that 
is underutilized under the existing statutory scheme.40 This problem 
may be solved in part by the Leahy bill, but other solutions may also 
be appropriate. In considering the roles that retired Justices might 
appropriately play, this Part also discusses how to structure incentives 
to encourage retired Justices to continue to serve the public. 
B. Retirement’s Costs 
In some ways, a Justice’s decision to retire resembles a 
retirement decision in any other profession, and, in many respects, 
the outcome is the same. The Court temporarily loses some ability to 
disperse its workload. The seat loses someone with experience and 
expertise that is almost invariably unmatched—at least at first—by 
her replacement’s. 
But the retirement of a Supreme Court Justice differs from other 
retirements. Unlike employees in other professions, Justices retire 
and then remain completely disengaged from the Supreme Court 
decisionmaking process. For professionals from physicians to athletes 
to corporate executives, even for lawyers in top firms, retirement 
usually means continued engagement—if not directly, at least as a 
consultant.41 Retired oncologists and Hall of Fame coaches may 
remain available to review difficult files, assist in tough cases, or offer 
 39. See id. (remarking that there would be a “[c]lear advantage in having there be a 5–4 
split, [which would] get the conflict resolved”). 
 40. See 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (2006) (outlining the procedure for assigning retired judges and 
Justices to perform judicial duties in the lower courts and noting that no designations or 
assignments “shall be made to the Supreme Court”). 
 41. See Neal E. Cutler, Working in Retirement: The Longevity Perplexities Continue, J. FIN. 
SERVICE PROFESSIONALS, July 2011, at 19, 21 (analyzing survey data to show that a quarter of 
respondents ages sixty-five to seventy-five reported that they were both retired and working). 
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their expertise for a fee to whoever needs it, wherever they might be, 
but particularly to their former employers. 
And, to be certain, the decision to continue serving as a 
consultant need not be motivated by financial remuneration, because 
by retirement most professionals are financially secure.42 Rather, they 
assist both because they can and because they enjoy the work.43 
Yet when it comes to Supreme Court Justices—some of the most 
accomplished, experienced, dedicated professionals in the country—
this option to remain a “player” is not available. Thus, the ineligibility 
of retired Justices to serve on the Supreme Court carries at least one 
obvious cost: it contributes to the atrophy of a valuable human 
resource, even when retired Justices remain active in other respects. 
C. Avoiding 4–4 Splits 
Although loss of human capital may be the broad problem 
occasioned by Justices’ retirements, proposals to permit them to 
return and “pinch hit” typically target a more specific issue: 4–4 splits 
due to recusals. When the Court divides evenly—in Court parlance, 
“affirms by an equally divided Court”—the lower court’s ruling 
stands, but no precedent is set.44 An analysis of any proposal along 
 42. Whether Supreme Court Justices are financially secure upon retirement will vary from 
case to case, notwithstanding the fact that Justices earn their full judicial salaries for life. See 28 
U.S.C. § 371(a) (2006) (“Any justice or judge of the United States appointed to hold office 
during good behavior may retire from the office after attaining the age and meeting the service 
requirements . . . and shall, during the remainder of his lifetime, receive an annuity equal to the 
salary he was receiving at the time he retired.”). As Chief Justice Roberts has noted in his 
annual Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, judicial salaries are quite low as compared to 
those of other high-profile lawyers. See, e.g., JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2008 YEAR-END REPORT 
ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7 (2008), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/
year-end/2008year-endreport.pdf (“I suspect many are tired of hearing it, and I know I am tired 
of saying it, but I must make this plea again—Congress must provide judicial compensation that 
keeps pace with inflation.”). 
 43. See Michael C. Dorf, Some Possible Hidden Complications of a Senate Proposal To 
Permit Retired Justices To Pinch-Hit for Their Recused Colleagues, FINDLAW (Oct. 6, 2010), 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20101006.html (commenting on how Justices O’Connor and 
Stevens have “expressed an interest in hearing cases by designation on [the] Court” and how 
“[e]ach of them remains mentally razor-sharp”). 
 44. Scholars have discussed whether letting a lower court decision stand is, in fact, a 
problem. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, Why We Call the Supreme Court “Supreme”: A Case Study 
on the Importance of Settling the National Law, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 129, 130–31 (2001) (arguing 
that affirmance by an equally divided Court fails to settle important issues); Hartnett, supra 
note 9, at 678 (“[T]here is good reason to retain the clear and long-established practice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States to affirm when, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, 
it finds itself evenly divided as to the judgment.”); William L. Reynolds & Gordon G. Young, 
Equal Divisions in the Supreme Court: History, Problems, and Proposals, 62 N.C. L. REV. 29, 56 
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the lines of the Leahy bill should therefore consider how serious a 
problem the 4–4 split really is.45 
In quantitative terms, the answer appears to be “not very.” On 
average, more than one-third of Supreme Court cases are decided 
unanimously.46 For example, in October Term 2009,47 forty of eighty-
six cases resulted in unanimous decisions.48 Out of the cases that are 
not decided unanimously, most are decided 8–1, 7–2, or 6–3.49 
Therefore, although the general public may have the perception that 
most cases split the Court 5–4—often along ideological lines with 
Justice Kennedy casting the swing vote50—5–4 votes in fact constitute 
a small percentage of the Court’s decided cases.51 And even among 
(1983) (“Th[e] practice [of affirming without opinion when the Court is split] has the virtue only 
of simplicity, failing to address either the Justices’ obligations to the litigants or to other 
branches of government.”); Jason Mazzone, 4–4 Is Fine, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 8, 2010, 1:59 
PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/10/4-4-is-fine.html (“The only effect of a 4–4 outcome is 
that the lower court decision stands. That can’t be a problem because it’s the result that occurs 
in the hundreds of cases the Court declines to hear each term. And it’s the result in the millions 
of cases that the Court is not even asked to review.”). 
 45. Note that Senator Leahy himself identified 4–4 splits as the chief harm that his bill 
sought to remedy, saying, “Given the Court’s recent rash of 5:4 rulings, the absence of one 
Justice could result in a 4:4 decision.” Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy Proposes 
Bill To Allow Retired Justices To Sit on Court by Designation (Sept. 29, 2010), available at 
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=D8C57B55-3988-4E00-BDE7-13459F4
AB540. 
 46. See Final Stats OT09, SCOTUSBLOG, 4 (July 7, 2010), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/07/Final-Stats-OT09-0707101.pdf (citing statistics for October Term 2006 
(38 percent of cases decided unanimously), October Term 2007 (30 percent decided 
unanimously), October Term 2008 (33 percent decided unanimously), and October Term 2009 
(47 percent decided unanimously)). For all four reported terms, more cases were decided 
unanimously than by a 5–4 vote split. Id. 
 47. As of this writing, October Term 2009 is the most recent full term for which there is 
data. 
 48. Final Stats OT09, supra note 46, at 4. 
 49. See id. (citing statistics for October Term 2006 (12 percent of cases decided 8–1, 12 
percent decided 7–2, 4 percent decided 6–3), October Term 2007 (8 percent of cases decided 8–
1, 28 percent decided 7–2, 14 percent decided 6–3), October Term 2008 (5 percent of cases 
decided 8–1, 16 percent decided 7–2, 16 percent decided 6–3), and October Term 2009 (9 
percent of cases decided 8–1 or 7–1, 15 percent decided 7–2, 10 percent decided 6–3)). 
 50. See Robert Barnes, Term Saw High Court Move to the Right, WASH. POST, July 1, 2009, 
at A1 (“It is a familiar ideological split: Roberts, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel 
A. Alito Jr. on one side; Stevens, Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer and Souter on the other. Justice 
Anthony M. Kennedy remains in the role of the decider, finding himself in the majority more 
than any other justice and siding twice as often in 5 to 4 votes with conservatives as he did with 
liberals.”); Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court, Tipped by Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at 
A1 (calling Kennedy “the most powerful jurist in America”). 
 51. In the 2009 term, the Court split 5–4 in only fourteen of the seventy-two cases in which 
it issued signed merits opinions. Final Stats OT09, supra note 46, at 4 (stating that there were 
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these cases, some are not split along ideological lines.52 In recent 
years, the Court has, on average, decided fewer than one case per 
term by a 4–4 vote as a result of a recusal.53 
Indeed, the problem remains quantitatively small even in an 
extraordinary term, such as October Term 2010. When Justice Kagan 
promised to recuse herself from roughly one-third of the Court’s 
docket, the 4–4 split was still not a serious problem. Based on the 
voting pattern from the October Term 2009, one of us predicted that 
Justice Kagan’s recusal in roughly one-third of the Court’s cases 
would only result in two or three 4–4 splits.54 As the term unfolded, 
her decision to recuse herself resulted in two such splits.55 Those two 
cases involved the following questions: whether the first-sale doctrine 
applies only to copyrighted items that are made and distributed in the 
United States;56 and whether a citizenship-transmission statute that 
imposes different standards for children born out of wedlock, 
depending on whether their mothers or fathers are citizens, is 
constitutional.57 These are not unimportant issues, but a delay in 
resolving them will not do serious damage.58 
Thus, there was hardly a compelling case for the Leahy bill based 
on a need to avoid 4–4 splits even when it was proposed, much less in 
sixteen 5–4 cases but including in that total two cases that were actually 5–3). But see Press 
Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, supra note 45 (remarking on “the Court’s recent rash of 5:4 
rulings”). 
 52. Five of the fourteen 5–4 decisions were not split along ideological lines. Final Stats 
OT09, supra note 46, at 3. 
 53. See Ryan Black & Lee Epstein, Recusals and the “Problem” of an Equally Divided 
Supreme Court, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 75, 92 (2005) (finding an average of 0.65 4–4 splits 
per term from 1986 to 2003). During the 2010 term, two cases were affirmed by an equally 
divided Court. Stat Pack for October Term 2010, supra note 1, at 3. 
 54. Dorf, supra note 43. Moreover, the Leahy bill seems poorly suited for resolving 
ideologically divisive 4–4 splits. See id. (“Based on recent experience, in roughly half of the 5–4 
cases in which Justice Stevens was in the majority, the Court split on ideological grounds. Yet in 
those cases, the conservative Justices might be reluctant to call on the assistance of one of their 
retired colleagues. And the selection of a particular Justice could itself be fraught.”); see also 
infra text accompanying notes 90–91. 
 55. See Stat Pack for October Term 2010, supra note 1, at 3. 
 56. See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2011) (mem.), aff’g mem. 
per curiam by an equally divided Court 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 57. See Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (mem.), aff’g mem. per curiam 
by an equally divided Court 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 58. Conversely, the Court may fail to produce a majority opinion even when no Justice is 
recused. For an example from the October 2010 Term, see J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
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retrospect. As Justice Kagan’s recusal rate settles to normal, the 
argument becomes weaker still. 
To be sure, there have been, and will continue to be, other 
periods when the Court finds itself with only eight members available, 
but there is little evidence to suggest that the experience during 
Justice Kagan’s first term was anomalous for such periods. Consider 
the last year of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s service, during which the 
Chief Justice was battling throat cancer and thus was repeatedly 
unavailable for Court business. Nonetheless, based in part on the late 
Chief Justice’s judicious marshalling of his remaining strength,59 no 4–
4 splits occurred.60 Large numbers of recusals or absences by future 
Justices could, in principle, lead to a substantial number of 4–4 splits, 
but that prospect is, for now, only hypothetical. We would be hard 
pressed to disagree with Professor Jason Mazzone’s characterization 
of the Leahy proposal as “a solution in search of a problem”61—at 
least so long as the proposal’s goal is understood to be transforming a 
substantial number of 4–4 splits into 5–4 rulings. 
Yet it could be argued that even one 4–4 split can be harmful. If 
a case presented an issue of sufficient importance to warrant a grant 
of certiorari in the first place, then failure to resolve the issue would 
be harmful, regardless of the outcome.62 We agree that this argument 
adds some force to the case for the Leahy proposal but would caution 
against overstating the point for two reasons. 
First, issues that are truly important to resolve are likely to recur, 
and a Justice who recused herself the first time a case came before the 
Court might often decide to participate the second time. Because the 
new case might involve different parties or circumstances, the 
Justice’s view on whether or not a conflict existed might change. 
Second, the Court is unlikely to be able to utilize a substitute 
Justice in precisely the cases that we have reason to think would 
 59. See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 74 (2005) (noting—and criticizing—“Chief Justice Rehnquist’s decision, 
when he first fell seriously ill in the fall of 2004, to participate for a time only in the decision of 
cases in which his would be the deciding vote”). 
 60. We searched for the term “affirmed by an equally divided Court” in the Supreme 
Court Westlaw database during the acute period of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s illness and 
returned no results. Accord The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
415, 423 tbl.I(C) (2005) (denoting no 4–4 splits for the October 2004 Term). 
 61. Mazzone, supra note 44. 
 62. Cf. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is 
usually more important that a rule of law be settled, than that it be settled right.”). In explaining 
his support for the Leahy bill, Justice Stevens made this same claim. See supra note 39. 
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result in 4–4 splits: ideologically divisive cases. In such circumstances, 
the more conservative Justices would presumably hesitate to call 
upon the services of a retired Justice who could swing the result in a 
liberal direction, and vice versa. As we explain in our discussion of 
strategic considerations, this problem is likely to persist regardless of 
what mechanism is used to select the particular retired Justice to use 
as a substitute at times when more than one retired Justice is 
available. 
In sum, 4–4 splits do not present a large problem when evaluated 
in quantitative terms and, although they could present a substantial 
problem qualitatively, the Leahy proposal is unlikely to do much to 
solve that problem. 
D. Quorums and Institutional Dynamics 
Historically, proposals to permit substitutes on the Supreme 
Court have tended to arise in response to the risk that no quorum63 
would be available to resolve an important case.64 But for much the 
same reason that the Leahy bill is unnecessary to resolve 4–4 splits, it 
is unnecessary to create a quorum: cases in which there is no quorum 
very rarely arise because the reasons one Justice may have for a 
recusal tend to be unconnected to the reasons for recusal of the other 
Justices.65 And in the sorts of cases in which we might expect recusals 
 63. A quorum for Supreme Court purposes is six Justices. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); SUP. CT. R. 
4. 
 64. See, e.g., To Change the Quorum of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing on 
H.R. 2808 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 78th Cong. (1943) 
(detailing hearings on a bill related to the Supreme Court’s quorum requirements). 
 65. Most Justices’ conflicts due to prior professional experience disappear after a year or 
two on the Court, although there are exceptions. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 
582 F.3d 309, 314 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that Justice Sotomayor was originally a member of the 
Second Circuit panel for this case, which was argued on June 7, 2006, and that Sotomayor was 
elevated to the Supreme Court on August 8, 2009, prior to the September 21, 2009, decision), 
cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010) (noting that Justice Sotomayor took no part in the 
consideration or decision of the petition). When he was confirmed in 1967, after serving as 
solicitor general, Justice Marshall recused himself in sixty-one cases, fifty-three of which were 
related to his work as solicitor general. Mark Walsh, A Changing Landscape: In First Court with 
Three Women, All Eyes Are on Justice Kagan, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2010, at 24, 25 (quoting Supreme 
Court practitioner Thomas C. Goldstein). Thereafter, Justice Marshall’s prior service as solicitor 
general rapidly ceased to warrant recusal, but throughout his career on the Court, he recused 
himself “in all cases involving two organizations with which he had long been associated—the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the NAACP Legal Defense 
(later ‘and Education’) Fund.” Ross E. Davies, The Reluctant Recusants, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 79, 
80 (2006). Once on the Court, most Justices work actively to avoid situations which might create 
conflicts and lead to recusals. See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Duff Wilson, Justices To Examine Rights 
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to be correlated—such as disputes over judicial pay or cases that 
involve so many corporate parties that multiple Justices can be 
expected to have a financial stake or a substantial prior relationship 
with at least one of them66—retired Justices would probably also 
recuse themselves. In these circumstances, the so-called “rule of 
necessity” should be a sufficient safeguard for ensuring that 
important cases are heard.67 
To be sure, one can imagine tragic circumstances in which 
multiple vacancies might cripple the Court. A plague, terrorist attack, 
or fatal accident that simultaneously killed or disabled multiple 
Justices, for example, could impair the Court’s ability to function. But 
such a tragedy would call for a much more robust and targeted 
response than the one contemplated by the Leahy bill. 
In the ordinary course of events, the Justices have shown a 
considerable capacity for accommodating one another’s career 
timetables. For example, when two or more Justices have been 
considering retirement in the same period, they have usually avoided 
saddling the president and Senate with simultaneous vacancies. Thus, 
Justice Marshall retired one year after Justice Brennan did, and 
Justice Stevens retired one year after Justice Souter did. Even when 
unforeseen events have outpaced the Justices’ plans—such as when 
Chief Justice Rehnquist died shortly after Justice O’Connor had 
announced her retirement, thus creating two simultaneous 
vacancies—the Court and the political system have quickly adjusted. 
On that occasion, President Bush redesignated the nomination of 
John Roberts from the O’Connor seat to the Chief Justice’s chair. 
Roberts was confirmed in time for the start of the new term, while 
of Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2010, at A20 (citing Chief Justice Roberts’s selling of 
Pfizer stock so that he could participate in two cases the company had before the Court). But cf. 
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (order denying motion to recuse) 
(declining to recuse himself after some commentators suggested that his duck-hunting trip with 
Vice President Cheney, the petitioner in the case, raised a potential conflict). 
 66. See Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008) (mem.) (describing a 
case in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito took no part in the 
consideration or decision of the petition). 
 67. The “rule of necessity” provides that even if a judge or Justice has an interest in a case, 
she must hear and decide the case if it otherwise cannot be heard. See, e.g., United States v. 
Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213–16 (1980) (describing the origin of the “rule of necessity”). 
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O’Connor retained her seat pending the confirmation of her own 
eventual successor.68 
What about cases in which only one, two, or three Justices are 
recused? Although the substitution of a retired Justice for a recused 
Justice would not be necessary to reach a quorum, it might have 
secondary effects on the dynamics of the Court at oral argument and 
in conference.69 Particularly in a small, close-knit group that works 
together for a number of years, having a group of eight rather than 
nine might well present a different kind of problem and raise a 
different kind of question: Do we value the conversation among nine 
Justices to the extent that having only eight, or only seven, or even 
only six diminishes the quality of the process and devalues the 
resulting decision, even when a majority prevails?70 
Undoubtedly, deliberations among a Court of six would be 
somewhat different from deliberations among a Court of nine, 
although it is difficult to say exactly how.71 In any event, a seriously 
shorthanded Court occurs with sufficient infrequency to suggest that 
this situation, too, is generally not a problem.72 
 68. Thus, the Court was not shorthanded, even though it took three nominees to fill 
O’Connor’s seat: Roberts; then, upon his move to Chief Justice, Harriet Miers; and, following 
the withdrawal of her nomination, Samuel Alito. GARRETT & RUTKUS, supra note 15, at 4–7. 
 69. See, e.g., Clifford May, On Judges and Justice: Byron White Reflects on Court and 
Critics, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June 30, 1996, at 69A, reprinted in DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE 
MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE app. C at 
467 (1998) (“[E]very time a new justice comes to the Supreme Court, it’s a different court.” 
(quoting Justice White)). 
 70. Cf. Berkolow, Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride and Precedent Amidst the Cacophony 
of Concurrences, and Re-Percolation After Rapanos, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 299, 329 n.142 
(2008) (“While this is troubling in the fractured opinion settling [sic], we do not tend to draw 
distinctions between a close majority (5–4) and a stronger majority (8–1) in terms of ascribing 
precedential weight. Even unanimous decisions are not necessarily valued any differently as 
precedent.”). 
 71. Although we cannot observe the Court’s deliberations, we can look to research about 
how juries deliberate for guidance. For a summary of the large volume of research on the effect 
of jury size on deliberations, see Dennis J. Devine, Laura D. Clayton, Benjamin B. Dunford, 
Rasmy Seying & Jennifer Pryce, Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on 
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 624–64 (2001). See also Ballew v. 
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232–39 (1978) (plurality opinion) (citing research in an effort to 
determine what size jury is necessary to guarantee the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury 
in criminal cases). 
 72. Even between 1946 and 2003, when the overall recusal rate was substantially higher 
than it has been recently (excepting Justice Kagan’s first year on the Court), at least eight 
Justices participated in almost 97 percent of the Court’s cases. See Black & Epstein, supra note 
53, at 90 n.59 (explaining the results and methodology of an empirical study of the use of 
discretionary recusals). 
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E. Strategic Considerations Under the Leahy Bill 
The foregoing Sections show that the Court would only rarely 
benefit substantially from the services of a retired Justice substituting 
for a recused or otherwise absent Justice. And even in those cases in 
which such a substitution might be thought beneficial, problems 
remain. 
With recusal at the discretion of each Justice,73 a Justice makes a 
difficult decision in each case that might warrant recusal. Although 
Justices seek to avoid the appearance of impropriety,74 whether a 
failure to recuse gives rise to such an appearance is often debatable. 
Because the Court is largely impervious to criticism in such cases,75 
because Justices would almost certainly recuse themselves in clear-cut 
conflict situations, and because impeachment is the only available 
remedy for clearly unethical decisions not to recuse,76 Justices are 
largely unaccountable for their recusal decisions. 
Consider, then, the following hypothetical example: A petitioner 
asks the Court to grant certiorari in a controversial case, one which 
might well divide the Court 5–4. As the petition begins to make its 
way through the Court’s review process, one Justice notes that she 
may have a conflict requiring recusal.77 
As the law now stands, in making her recusal decision, that 
Justice must consider whether the potential conflict would affect her 
ability to decide the case neutrally and whether the conflict might 
 73. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006); see also Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915–16 
(2004) (Scalia, J.) (order denying motion to recuse) (arguing by implication that the decision to 
recuse when the rules do not clearly dictate recusal is up to each individual Justice). 
 74. See, e.g., Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the 
Procedural Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 123–24 (2004) (discussing 
Justice Scalia’s recusal in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004), a 
Ninth Circuit case that he had criticized prior to the Supreme Court’s hearing the case); cf. 
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007) (“A judge shall uphold and promote the 
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the 
appearance of impropriety.”). 
 75. See Cheney, 541 U.S. at 923 (arguing that Justices should not recuse themselves merely 
because “a significant portion of the press” demands it). 
 76. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, 
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”). 
 77. Because recusal almost always occurs before the Justices discuss the certiorari petition 
at conference, a Justice must make the decision about whether to recuse herself before she 
knows whether four of her colleagues will vote to grant certiorari. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. 
Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 1133 (2010) (granting the petition for a writ of certiorari and 
noting that “Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition”). 
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create the appearance of impropriety.78 But were Congress to 
authorize the substitution of a retired Justice to fill the vacancy, she 
might well consider one additional factor: which retired Justice might 
take her place in deciding the case were she to recuse herself.79 
Why? Because if the Justice would likely be part of a five-Justice 
majority, then her recusal would reduce the votes on her side of the 
issue to four. Were a Justice of a different ideological ilk to take her 
place, the majority—and the opportunity to set precedent in a 
controversial area of the law—would go to the other side. 
So what is a Justice in this position to do? At a formal and 
conscious level, the answer is clear: the Justice should decide whether 
to recuse without regard to such collateral consequences.80 But as 
 78. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)–(b). According to Senator Leahy, some Justices might choose not to 
recuse themselves simply because their absences from the cases might create a 4–4 split. See 
Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, supra note 45 (“Retired Justices may be designated to sit 
on any court in the land except the one to which they were confirmed . . . . The bill I am 
introducing today will ensure that the Supreme Court can continue to serve its essential 
function. In recent history, Justices have refused to recuse themselves and one of their 
justifications has been that the Supreme Court is unlike lower courts because no other judge can 
serve in their place when Justices recuse.”); see also Cheney, 541 U.S. at 915 (“Let me respond, 
at the outset, to Sierra Club’s suggestion that I should ‘resolve any doubts in favor of recusal.’ 
That might be sound advice if I were sitting on a Court of Appeals. There, my place would be 
taken by another judge, and the case would proceed normally. On the Supreme Court, however, 
the consequence is different: The Court proceeds with eight Justices, raising the possibility that, 
by reason of a tie vote, it will find itself unable to resolve the significant legal issue presented by 
the case.” (citations omitted)); Black & Epstein, supra note 53, at 75–81 (describing the 
commonly held sentiment among Supreme Court Justices that the possibility of a split-decision 
should weigh into a Justice’s determination of whether or not to recuse herself); An Open 
Discussion with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1033, 1039 (2004) (“In 
interpreting this provision, one should distinguish the situation of a district judge or a court of 
appeals judge, from that of a Supreme Court Justice. A case such as the one you mentioned 
would be an easy call for a judge who was replaceable, for example, a court of appeals judge on 
a three-judge panel. If there were any doubt, that judge could step out and let one of her 
colleagues replace her. But on the Supreme Court, if one of us is out, that leaves eight, and the 
attendant risk that we will be unable to decide the case, that it will divide evenly. Some think 
that a recusal in the Supreme Court is equivalent to a vote against the petitioner. When cases 
divide evenly, we affirm the decision below automatically. Because there’s no substitute for a 
Supreme Court Justice, it is important that we not lightly recuse ourselves.”). 
 79. Note that Senator Leahy himself did not view this problem as likely to arise. Barring 
retired Justices from pitching in “defies common sense,” he maintained, while their availability 
“would encourage sitting justices to recuse themselves when there is even an appearance of a 
conflict of interest.” Jess Bravin, Welcome Back, Souter (and O’Connor and Stevens), WALL ST. 
J. WASH. WIRE (Sept. 29, 2010, 1:04 PM ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/09/29/
welcome-back-souter-and-oconnor-and-stevens. 
 80. Justice Stevens is emphatic that Justices must recuse themselves when recusal rules so 
dictate, without regard for strategic considerations including the possibility of a 4–4 split. See 
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human beings, Justices are subject to all of the same cognitive biases 
as everyone else, so they can be expected to make close recusal 
decisions under the influence of their strategic perceptions of the 
consequences for the merits.81 Even if only unconsciously, a Justice 
might choose not to recuse herself under a rotation system, in which 
she knew exactly which retired Justice was next in line to fill an empty 
seat, or under a random system, in which a Justice was to be chosen at 
random but the odds were unfavorable for an ideological ally to be 
the choice. Likewise, she might choose not to recuse herself in a 
system like the one suggested by Justice Stevens, in which a retired 
Justice would be slotted in based on his or her legal expertise,82 if that 
Justice’s views on the issue in the case were well known, or at least 
easily anticipated, and did not align with the potentially recused 
Justice’s own.83 
Strategic decisionmaking would not necessarily be limited to 
cases in which a sitting Justice was recused. Sitting Justices would 
always be aware that their retired colleagues could become unretired 
for the purposes of some case down the road. With that prospect in 
mind, a Justice might not choose to overrule a case in which a retired 
colleague wrote the majority because she might need that colleague’s 
vote in a future case down the road. Although the Court’s culture 
does not allow explicit logrolling, that fact does not mean that Justices 
never consider one another’s presumed preferences.84 
Telephone Interview with John Paul Stevens, supra note 7 (“Standards of recusal are totally 
independent of what would occur after recusal.”). 
 81. For insight into how the thinking behind this strategic decisionmaking might work, see 
generally Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. 
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129 (1954). 
 82. Justice Stevens offered the example of recalling Justice Blackmun when the Court was 
shorthanded on tax cases, had the proposal been in effect between Justice Blackmun’s 
retirement and death. Telephone Interview with John Paul Stevens, supra note 7; see generally 
Robert A. Green, Justice Blackmun’s Federal Tax Jurisprudence, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109 
(1998) (describing Justice Blackmun’s experience in writing tax opinions). 
 83. Strategic opportunities become even more obvious under the language of the proposed 
law. According to the Leahy bill, “a majority of active justices vote to designate and assign that 
retired Chief Justice or Associate Justice.’’ S. 3871, 111th Cong. sec. 1, § 2(b) (2010). Therefore, 
according to the bill’s plain language, when choosing a retired Justice to fill the seat of a recused 
Justice, the selection would not be random. Instead, the eight remaining sitting Justices would 
choose the retired Justice who would substitute. Therefore, the four Justices who vote to grant 
certiorari could push for a particular retired Justice to sit in, and they would effectively win the 
case before it is even argued. 
 84. Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary 
Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 607 (2003) (“It is often observed—correctly—that logrolling 
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F.  Administrability 
The Leahy proposal leaves open many issues of administration: 
Would the retired Justice write opinions? Would she participate in 
the conference at which certiorari is granted if the recusal occurred 
before certiorari were granted? Would she share her one law clerk 
with another chambers for that particular case, or would a screening 
mechanism be adopted to prevent the retired Justice’s law clerk from 
acting as a conduit of information between chambers? Would that 
one clerk take on a disproportionate amount of work85 as compared 
to the chambers of sitting Justices, where four clerks routinely 
serve?86 If there were only one living retired Justice, as was the case, 
for example, when Justice O’Connor retired,87 would the proposal 
require that individual to serve as a substitute in every case in which a 
sitting Justice recused herself, even if, as in October Term 2010, that 
would mean participating in one-third of the Court’s caseload for the 
term?88 
Beyond the practicalities of implementing a substitution system, 
as we have already suggested, the system itself would require a 
mechanism to select which retired Justice would serve when multiple 
retired Justices were available. The two most obvious approaches are 
random selection and strict rotation. A strict rotation system could 
lead to some of the problems already discussed, with Justices, at least 
subconsciously, making recusal decisions and voting on whether to 
substitute a retired Justice based in part on how the particular 
substitute would be likely to vote on the merits. The same problem 
arises out of a different proposal suggested to us by Justice Stevens—
is prohibited under the decisional norms of the Supreme Court, but it is impossible to erase 
considerations of good will entirely from human behavior.” (footnote omitted)). 
 85. In addition to drafting opinions, law clerks in many chambers routinely, inter alia, 
participate in the certiorari pool, write bench memos, help prepare their Justice for conference 
and oral argument, work on petitions for stays of executions, and write speeches. See generally 
TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006) (describing the multi-faceted responsibilities of Supreme 
Court clerks). 
 86. EUGENE GRESSMAN, KENNETH S. GELLER, STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, TIMOTHY S. 
BISHOP & EDWARD A. HARTNETT, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 37 (9th ed. 2007). 
 87. The same was also true when several other Justices retired, as well as for many Justices 
who left the Court in the years before retirement was possible. See, e.g., ATKINSON, supra note 
12, at 80 (describing the retirement of Justice Moody). 
 88. The Supreme Court decided eighty-two merits cases during the 2010 term. Stat Pack for 
October Term 2010, supra note 1, at 27. Justice Kagan was recused in twenty-eight, Chief Justice 
Roberts in one, and Justice Sotomayor in two. Id. at 43–51. 
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using an “expert” retired Justice in a case involving specialized 
expertise.89 
According to the Leahy bill, a majority of active Justices would 
have to vote to substitute a retired Justice for a recused one. If 
Justices voted for or against a particular Justice,90 then the mechanism 
would almost surely fail in precisely those cases in which it might be 
thought most useful: predictably ideologically divisive 4–4 splits. The 
decision to bring in a particular Justice would be made with 
knowledge of the outcome to which that Justice’s participation would 
likely lead.91 That fact, in turn, suggests that no substitution would 
occur in ideologically divisive cases or that some other system of 
selection would have to be used. 
For these reasons, we think that a lottery system would likely be 
deemed most practicable, although with a small number of retired 
Justices at any given time, strategic factors could still play a role. For 
example, the three Justices that were retired in 2011—Justice Stevens, 
Justice O’Connor, and Justice Souter—were all more liberal on most 
issues than the median Justice—Justice Kennedy. Thus, under 
these—and most foreseeable—circumstances, just about any selection 
method could give rise to strategic behavior. 
We do not mean to suggest that the foregoing objections are 
impossible to answer, but merely that no answer will be perfect or 
even mostly satisfactory. Indeed, it is not even clear what mechanism 
would be used to provide the answers: All of these issues could be 
resolved in an amended version of the Leahy bill, but for Congress to 
specify too much about what is in substantial measure a matter of the 
Court’s internal decisional processes could be seen as a threat to 
separation of powers. Within the Court, such matters could be 
resolved by any number of mechanisms, including the promulgation 
by a majority of the Court of an amendment to the Supreme Court 
 89. See supra note 82. 
 90. The bill is unclear as to whether the Justices would vote to substitute a particular 
retired Justice or just a retired Justice in general. By its plain language, it would appear to 
suggest that a particular Justice would somehow come before the conference for a vote (“a 
majority of active justices vote to designate and assign that retired Chief Justice or Associate 
Justice”), but the bill does not specify how that Justice would be selected. S. 3871, 111th Cong. 
sec. 1, § 2 (2010). 
 91. The Leahy bill is also unclear in defining exactly who constitutes the majority, saying 
only “a majority of active justices vote to designate and assign that retired Chief Justice or 
Associate Justice.” Id. Would the “majority” number include the recused Justice, meaning that 
only four Justices involved in the case would have to vote to substitute in the retired Justice? Or 
would the number include only the eight Justices involved in the case? 
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Rules.92 Alternatively, the Court could adopt an internal practice for 
the selection of retired Justice substitutes without codifying that 
practice in any formal rule, presumably by consensus.93 The 
procedure adopted for choosing a method of selecting retired Justices 
could in turn affect what method would be 
*          *          * 
There appears to be no pressing need for retired Justices to 
substitute for recused or otherwise absent Justices, and the adoption 
of a scheme permitting such substitutions could give rise to strategic 
behavior and implementation difficulties. Even so, these concerns, 
although serious, are not so grave as to render proposals along the 
lines of the Leahy bill complete nonstarters. As noted at the 
beginning of this Part, retired Justices are a valuable resource whose 
continued engagement in Supreme Court decisionmaking could 
provide genuine, if modest, benefits. 
III.  IS THE LEAHY PROPOSAL CONSTITUTIONAL? 
Based on the foregoing considerations, we think the case for the 
Leahy bill is at best uncertain. Nonetheless, others may weigh the 
costs and benefits differently. For those who conclude that the 
proposal, on balance, deserves support, a further issue arises: Is it 
constitutional? This Part considers the constitutional limits on the 
ability of Congress to authorize retired Justices to perform judicial 
duties. Although there is a nonfrivolous argument that the Leahy 
proposal would violate Article III’s requirement that there be “one 
supreme Court,” we ultimately reject that argument. We conclude 
that as long as Justices have only retired from active duty, rather than 
having resigned their commissions, neither Article III nor any other 
constitutional provision forbids them from serving on the Supreme 
Court or on lower federal courts by designation.94 
 92. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2006) (setting forth the power of the Supreme Court and the 
lower courts to promulgate rules of practice and procedure consistent with acts of Congress). 
 93. The so-called “Rule of Four” for granting a petition for a writ of certiorari is an 
example of such an uncodified practice. See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 86, at 323–24 
(explaining the Court’s “Rule of Four”). 
 94. Indeed, federal statutory law not only permits retired Justices to serve on the lower 
federal courts by designation, but, subject to an exception for disabled Justices, it mandates such 
service or other work for retirees who wish to receive any judicial pay raises authorized after 
their retirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 371(b)–(c), (e) (2006). 
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A. Service on Lower Courts 
The Constitution nowhere expressly provides for the retirement 
of Supreme Court Justices or Article III judges, but from the earliest 
days of the Republic, it has been understood that Justices and judges 
can resign their commissions.95 Most prominently, John Jay, the first 
Chief Justice, left his seat on the Court to become governor of New 
York.96 
Retirement differs from resignation, however. Lower court 
judges who accept senior status and Supreme Court Justices who 
retire but remain available to serve by designation on lower courts 
continue to be members of the Article III judiciary.97 The relevant 
statutory language formerly distinguished between a judge who 
“resigns his office” and one who chooses instead to “retire.”98 In its 
current form, however, the U.S. Code distinguishes between a judge 
or Justice who chooses to “retire from the office” and one who 
chooses instead to “retain the office but retire from regular active 
service,” hearing cases only by occasional designation.99 For clarity 
and simplicity, we use the older terminology, distinguishing between 
“resignation” and “retirement.” 
The notion that a retired Supreme Court Justice remains an 
Article III judge was endorsed by the Supreme Court itself. In 1934, 
in Booth v. United States,100 the Court held that a retired judge is—so 
far as the salary-protection provision of Article III is concerned—just 
like any other Article III judge.101 As a matter of doctrine, then, 
Booth appears to dispose of any constitutional challenge to the 
practice of retired judges’ and Justices’ providing some form of 
occasional Article III judici
Moreover, the reasoning in Booth remains sound. At least as far 
as lower federal court judges are concerned, a retired judge is, 
constitutionally speaking, just another Article III judge. Judges who 
 95. WARD, supra note 35, at 26. 
 96. HENRY B. RENWICK, LIVES OF JOHN JAY AND ALEXANDER HAMILTON 119–20 (New 
York, Harper & Bros. 1841). 
 97. See Booth v. United States, 291 U.S. 339, 352 (1934) (holding that Article III bars 
Congress from reducing the salary of a retired judge). 
 98. Id. at 348 n.1 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 375 (1926) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 371 
(2006))). 
 99. 28 U.S.C. § 371(a)–(b)(1). 
 100. Booth v. United States, 291 U.S. 339 (1934). 
 101. Id. at 351 (concluding that the “status” of a retired judge when sitting by designation “is 
the same as that of any active judge”). 
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find themselves no longer able or willing to handle a full docket may 
still have the energy to oversee a partial docket. Given the 
Constitution’s silence on these matters, Congress should be permitted 
to take advantage of the cost savings and accumulated wisdom that 
retired judges provide. 
Similarly, service by retired Supreme Court Justices on lower 
federal courts appears to be constitutionally unobjectionable. As 
early as 1803, the Supreme Court deemed the practice of assigning 
active Justices to lower federal courts—via circuit riding—to be so 
well established as to be beyond constitutional doubt.102 Admittedly, 
the Court’s ruling in that case, Stuart v. Laird,103 was arguably issued 
under threat of impeachment or worse from the Jeffersonian 
Congress.104 But that fact makes Stuart problematic only insofar as it 
upheld the abolition of judgeships; its terse analysis of the 
permissibility of circuit riding appears sound. 
To be sure, it is possible to parse the text of Article III to 
mandate a different result by reading the terms “Offices” and 
“Office” in Section 1 to imply that a judge or Justice is appointed to a 
particular court only. But this is hardly a required reading. “Office” 
historically has been read to mean something more generic, such as 
“judicial office.”105 
And for good reason. Because an Article III judge cannot be 
fired or have her salary reduced once named to the judiciary, a rigid 
reading of “Office” would greatly impede Congress’s ability to adjust 
the organization of the lower courts, as Congress did, for example, 
when it split the former Fifth Circuit into the current Fifth and 
 102. See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (determining that “practice and 
acquiescence under” the system of circuit riding “for a period of several years, commencing with 
the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the 
construction” of Article III). 
 103. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). 
 104. See Michael W. McConnell, The Story of Marbury v. Madison: Making Defeat Look 
Like Victory, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 13, 31 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009) 
(noting that the Stuart Court was “powerless to confront [the Judiciary Act repeal] directly”). 
 105. In Booth, the Court took a broad view of the term “office” by holding that a retired 
judge or Justice retains her “office” even when she is not hearing cases. Booth, 291 U.S. at 351. 
Further, the Court has concluded that Article III allows retired Supreme Court Justices to ride 
circuit without requiring that they go through the confirmation process again. See supra note 
102 and accompanying text. This lends support to the idea that the term “office” in section 1 
refers broadly to some federal judicial office rather than to a seat on any particular Article III 
court. 
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Eleventh Circuits.106 Such a reading would also prevent Congress 
from assigning judges to fulfill temporary judicial duties when the 
need arises. Instead, Congress would have to create and staff new 
judicial offices at substantial expense. This disincentive in turn would 
put pressure on Congress to substitute administrative adjudication for 
judicial adjudication whenever permissible.107 Given the overall 
purpose of Article III—to ensure an independent judiciary—a 
reading of the protean term “Office” that would lead to the 
circumvention of the independent judiciary should be avoided. 
Accordingly, the longstanding practice of assigning retired judges and 
Justices to hear cases on the lower federal courts raises no substantial 
questions under Article III. 
B. Article III’s Requirement of One Supreme Court 
What about the proposal to permit retired Supreme Court 
Justices to sit by designation on the Supreme Court itself? Here there 
is at least a prima facie textual obstacle. Article III vests the judicial 
power in “one supreme Court.”108 A Court with fluctuating 
membership, the objection goes, would not be “one” Supreme Court, 
but several different Courts. 
This constitutional objection has some substance. Thus, we do 
not go quite so far as the late Justice White, who once proposed, 
without even pausing to consider the text of Article III, that “[r]ather 
than one Supreme Court, there might be two, one for statutory issues 
and one for constitutional cases; or one for criminal and one for civil 
cases.”109 Even this seemingly radical proposal might have been 
reconcilable with Article III’s text,110 but at the least, it should have 
 106. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 
1994 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2006)). 
 107. The outer limits of congressional power to assign potential Article III business to non-
Article III bodies are, to say the least, unclear, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. 
MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 363 (6th ed. 2009) (suggesting that the Supreme 
Court’s cases have “brought little but confusion to this area since” 1932), but it is clear that 
Congress has considerable power in this regard. 
 108. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 109. Byron R. White, Challenges for the U.S. Supreme Court and the Bar: Contemporary 
Reflections, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 275, 281 (1982). 
 110. We describe two arguments for reconciling a divided Supreme Court with the 
requirement of “one supreme Court.” First, we suggest that the availability of en banc review 
would satisfy the requirement. See infra text accompanying notes 121–122. Second, we note how 
the constitutionally “real” Supreme Court need not have jurisdiction over all cases to qualify as 
DORF IN FINAL 10/6/2011  6:42:29 PM 
108 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:81 
 
raised a prima facie worry. Nonetheless, although the matter is not 
entirely free from doubt, we believe that the better reading of Article 
III’s requirement of “one supreme Court” would permit retired 
Justices to serve as substitutes for recused or otherwise-unavailable 
Justices. 
To see why, consider a related question: Could Congress 
authorize the Supreme Court to sit in panels, rather than in plenary 
sessions? In two provocative articles, Professors Tracey George and 
Chris Guthrie offer just such a proposal.111 They argue that a move to 
panels, accompanied by an increase in the Court’s size, would provide 
benefits that would outweigh the costs,112 but they do not address the 
constitutional objection in any detail.113 Instead, they assume the 
validity of Supreme Court panels because Congress and others have 
repeatedly considered them, because there is a longstanding practice 
of single-Justice decisions, and because there is no clear prohibition in 
the constitutional text or history.114 
We agree with George and Guthrie as a matter of text. Certainly 
a court that regularly sits in panels—like the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit—can be understood as “one” court.115 But the 
original understanding of Article III is somewhat more complicated. 
Professor Ross Davies argues that participants in the debates at the 
the “one supreme Court” in light of the Exceptions Clause. See infra text accompanying notes 
122–124. Depending on how the courts’ jurisdiction was carved up, both arguments would be 
available in principle to defend Justice White’s proposal. 
 111. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court in the 
Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1458–65 (2009); Tracey E. George & Chris 
Guthrie, “The Threes”: Re-Imagining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1825 
(2008) [hereinafter George & Guthrie, “The Threes”]. 
 112. See George & Guthrie, “The Threes,” supra note 111, at 1847 (“[W]e believe that the 
benefits associated with doubling or tripling the Court’s output—even if this means that some 
panel decisions would differ from decisions the Court would make as a whole, or that some of 
the decisions would be of lower quality—would be worth it.”). For skepticism toward the policy 
grounds for the George and Guthrie proposal, see generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Response, No 
Warrant for Radical Change: A Response to Professors George and Guthrie, 58 DUKE L.J. 1691 
(2009). 
 113. See George & Guthrie, “The Threes,” supra note 111, at 1847 n.85 (“We do not 
consider in this paper whether Article III’s dictate of ‘one supreme Court’ requires that all 
Justices participate in all decisions.”). 
 114. Id. 
 115. The concept of multiple combinations of players making up one team is familiar from 
sports. In American football, different players take the field for offense and defense; hockey 
players typically take the ice in shifts; substitutes check in and out of the game in basketball; and 
baseball teams routinely change at least the pitcher from one game to the next. Yet in each of 
these examples we have no difficulty referring to the single team that these various 
combinations of players compose. 
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Philadelphia Convention assumed that “one supreme Court” meant 
one indivisible Supreme Court.116 That may only show, however, that 
the Framers expected the Supreme Court to be indivisible. Davies 
himself acknowledges that the indivisibility question did not arise 
during the public debate over ratification.117 Insofar as the original 
understanding is the original public meaning of the document,118 we 
are thus thrown back upon the plain text, which did not and does not 
answer the question whether the “one supreme Court” must be 
indivisible. 
Postenactment history is also equivocal. Professor Davies 
characterizes the assumption of Supreme Court indivisibility as 
“consistently shared by almost all judges, bureaucrats, and scholars” 
since the Founding.119 This is an overstatement, as illustrated by the 
examples—both those that have been adopted and those that were 
merely proposed—cited by Professors George and Guthrie,120 as well 
as one example Davies discusses at length himself: from 1802 to 1839, 
a single Justice was empowered to act on many matters in place of the 
entire Supreme Court during an “August Term.”121 
Even if one thinks the 1802–1839 experience was a constitutional 
anomaly, there remains a fatal flaw in the argument that Congress 
 116. See Ross E. Davies, A Certain Mongrel Court: Congress’s Past Power and Present 
Potential To Reinforce the Supreme Court, 90 MINN. L. REV. 678, 685–87 (2006) (discussing this 
assumption in relation to a debate at the Convention over whether Congress should have the 
power to raise judicial salaries). 
 117. See id. at 686 (noting that, aside from the Convention debate over judicial salaries, 
“[t]he ‘one supreme Court’ question was never again an issue in the framing or ratification of 
the Constitution”). 
 118. Although neither of the present authors is an originalist in the sense of one who gives 
decisive weight to the original understanding when it is clear, we both recognize the important 
role of original understanding in constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, 
Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 
GEO. L.J. 1765, 1800–22 (1997) (explaining why original understanding may be relevant for 
nonoriginalists). And we generally agree with those “new originalists” who argue that the 
original meaning that matters most is the original public understanding rather than the 
subjective expected applications of the drafters. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE 
LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89 (2004) (“[T]he words of the 
Constitution should be interpreted according to the meaning they had at the time they were 
enacted.”). 
 119. Davies, supra note 116, at 687. 
 120. See George & Guthrie, “The Threes,” supra note 111, at 1853–55 (describing past 
proposals by Congress and in foreign nations to have high courts sit in panels). 
 121. See Davies, supra note 116, at 696–705 (describing the single-Justice “rump Court”); see 
also Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal 
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 268 n.213 (1985) (explaining that Supreme Court panels are 
not anomalous unless “we confuse the historically familiar with the constitutionally necessary”). 
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could not authorize the Supreme Court to conduct most of its 
business in panels. So long as Supreme Court en banc review of panel 
decisions were available, even a formalist reading of the “one 
supreme Court” requirement would still be satisfied: The Court 
sitting en banc would be the “real” indivisible Supreme Court, while 
the panels could be understood as lower federal courts. The 
experience of circuit riding—not to mention the service of retired 
Justices on lower federal courts—validates the service of Supreme 
Court Justices on lower federal courts, and nothing in Article III 
prohibits Congress from creating a lower federal court staffed entirely 
by Supreme Court Justices. 
To be sure, en banc review would not always be available to 
validate the participation of retired Justices in Supreme Court cases. 
Suppose that, as now, there are two or more retired Justices available 
to serve on a substitute basis, and that one active Justice is recused. 
Using the designated procedure—random selection, let us say—one 
of the retired Justices is chosen to replace the recused active Justice. 
Now it becomes impossible to locate a single, indivisible Supreme 
Court that is available for en banc review. One need not be troubled 
by the absence of the recused Justice, for the possibility of recusal 
surely does not undermine indivisibility. If it did, then every recusal 
would violate Article III’s supposed indivisibility requirement. But 
neither will the remaining retired Justice or Justices who were not 
chosen as substitutes be called upon to serve on an en banc Court to 
review the judgment. Consequently, it appears that one might be left 
to draw the conclusion that substituting a retired Justice for an active 
one violates the putative indivisibility requirement, even if the use of 
Supreme Court panels would not. 
But such a counterintuitive conclusion would be unwarranted. At 
the very least, one can concoct a technical fix. Suppose one really 
thought that Article III required that there be a single indivisible 
Supreme Court. If so, Congress could denominate the active Justices 
as the constitutionally required “real” Supreme Court while limiting 
that body to hearing original-jurisdiction cases and a tiny fraction of 
the appellate-jurisdiction cases described in Article III. Retired 
Justices would then be ineligible to serve on original-jurisdiction 
cases, of which there are precious few.122 Under such a scheme, the 
 122. The Court disposed of fifteen original-jurisdiction cases between 1999 and 2009, 
averaging fewer than two per term. For the number of original-jurisdiction cases disposed of in 
each term from 1999 to 2009, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 
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vast majority of the de facto Supreme Court’s appellate work—
including cases in which a retired Justice substituted for a recused or 
otherwise unavailable Justice—would be conceptualized for Article 
III purposes as “really” the work of a lower federal court, much in the 
way that under the Judiciary Act of 1789, Justices sat on lower federal 
courts while riding circuit. 
The key to this odd arrangement would be that Congress has the 
power to whittle away the Court’s appellate jurisdiction under Article 
III itself, which authorizes “Exceptions.”123 It is even possible that 
Congress could “except” all cases from the “real” Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction, but if one took the view that the very notion of 
“an ‘exception’ implies some residuum of jurisdiction, Congress could 
meet that test by excluding everything but patent cases”124 or some 
other residual category. 
We do not actually favor this clunky arrangement, but we 
introduce it to show that a highly formalistic reading of “one supreme 
Court” can be met by a highly formalistic reading of other provisions 
of Article III. The better course, however, is to look to the functional 
reality. The technical details of the argument for the constitutionality 
of Supreme Court adjudication in panels are less important than the 
bottom line. If so radical a change as Supreme Court panels satisfies 
Article III—as it arguably does—then it should be very difficult to 
find constitutional fault with a change so minor as a statute that 
would permit retired Supreme Court Justices to occasionally 
OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 82 tbl.A-1 (2011); 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 84 tbl.A-1 (2008); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS 69 tbl.A-1 (2004). 
 123. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he supreme Court shall have appellate 
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the 
Congress shall make.”). 
 124. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: 
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364–65 (1953). Hart apparently meant this 
suggestion facetiously. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 107, at 296 (assuming that “Hart’s own 
view” was captured by the dialogue’s other speaker, who posits that “exceptions must not be 
such as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan”). The 
Supreme Court itself, however, has not articulated any real limits on the Exceptions Clause 
other than those that follow from the constraints on suspension of the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 575 (2006) 
(noting, but not addressing, “grave questions about Congress’ authority to impinge upon this 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction, particularly in habeas cases”); id. at 672 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(wondering “how there could be any such lurking questions, in light of the aptly named 
‘Exceptions Clause’”). 
DORF IN FINAL 10/6/2011  6:42:29 PM 
112 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:81 
 
substitute for recused or otherwise-unavailable Justices. One must 
remember that Article III nowhere expressly states that the “one 
supreme Court” must be indivisible, so these mental gymnastics may 
not even be necessary. Thus, we ultimately find no obstacle in Article 
III to service on the Court by retired Justices. Were Congress to 
make a policy judgment in favor of the Leahy bill, it should pass 
constitutional muster under Article III. 
IV.  ETHICAL CONSTRAINTS ON ADJUDICATION BY RETIRED 
JUSTICES 
The Leahy proposal is still not out of the woods, though, and not 
just because the policy case for it is uncertain. Federal statutory 
provisions governing disqualifications125—and in rare circumstances, 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause126—require judges and 
Justices to recuse themselves from cases in which they are or may be 
biased. Such recusals will typically provide the very occasion for the 
substitution of a retired Justice under the Leahy proposal. In 
addition, retired Justices may themselves be subject to recusal based 
on the reality or appearance of a conflict of interest. 
Indeed, some retired Justices may face conflicts requiring recusal 
in a relatively large proportion of the cases on which they would 
otherwise be asked to sit because, unlike that of active Justices, most 
of a retired Justice’s time will be taken up with nonjudicial tasks, 
thereby creating the potential for more occasions for recusal. By 
speaking out on such matters as the death penalty127 and state judicial 
 125. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006). The statute expressly applies to “any justice” as well as 
“any . . . judge.” Id. § 455(a). By contrast, the further ethical rules that have been adopted by the 
Judicial Conference for federal judges do not apply to Supreme Court Justices. See CODE OF 
CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES 2 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.
aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02A-Ch02.pdf (“This Code applies to United 
States circuit judges, district judges, Court of International Trade judges, Court of Federal 
Claims judges, bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges.”). 
 126. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) (“Because the 
codes of judicial conduct provide more protection than due process requires, most disputes over 
disqualification will be resolved without resort to the Constitution.”). Although Caperton 
involved state judges and, thus, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the standard 
is the same for federal judges and Justices under the Fifth Amendment. Cf. McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 (2010) (noting that the Bill of Rights generally applies the same 
standards to the federal government as the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states). 
 127. Retired Justice Powell chaired a commission that recommended reforms of habeas 
corpus in cases relating to the death penalty and beyond. See AD HOC COMM. ON FED. HABEAS 
CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., COMMITTEE REPORT (1989), 
reprinted in 45 Crim. L. Rep. 3239 (1989); see also O’Connor Questions Death Penalty Fairness, 
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elections,128 a publicly engaged retired Justice may develop the 
appearance or reality of a bias more often than would an active 
Justice who spends the lion’s share of her time on Court business. 
To be sure, a retired Justice will likely spend a smaller portion of 
her typical day working than she spent before retirement. That is, 
after all, the usual point of retiring. Still, if the retired Justice remains 
reasonably active in public life—as will typically be true of those 
retired Justices willing to serve as substitutes on the Supreme 
Court129—then she likely will still spend more time on average 
pursuing extrajudicial matters than before retirement. 
In this Part, we ask whether retired Justices’ taking an active role 
in public life is compatible with occasional service as a substitute on 
the Supreme Court. After concluding that retired Justices ought to 
have at least as much freedom as active Justices and other Article III 
judges to perform nonjudicial functions, we ask whether the limits on 
such activities ought to be relaxed for retired Justices in light of the 
fact that they only occasionally serve judicial functions. Although the 
cleaner answer would treat retired and active Justices identically, we 
tentatively suggest that there may be some room for a wider 
nonjudicial role by retired Justices. 
A. Recusal of Retired Justices Under Existing Law 
Current law provides what might be thought to be a fully 
dispositive answer to the question of whether retired Justices can 
return to hear cases. When sitting by designation on a lower federal 
court, a retired Supreme Court Justice is subject to recusal in exactly 
the same circumstances as those in which an active judge or Justice 
would be. 
The relevant statute first requires federal judges, Justices, and 
magistrates to recuse themselves “in any proceeding in which [their] 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”130 The statute then lists 
ABC NEWS (July 3, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=92961 (reporting statements by 
retired Justice O’Connor expressing reservations about the administration of the death penalty). 
 128. Retired Justice O’Connor has criticized the politicization of state judicial elections and 
has called for states to choose their judges by a merit-based selection system. For examples of 
her public statements on this issue, see Sandra Day O’Connor, Fair & Independent Courts, 
DAEDALUS, Fall 2008, at 8; Sandra Day O’Connor, How To Save Our Courts, PARADE, Feb. 
24, 2008, at 5; and Sandra Day O’Connor, Op-Ed., Take Justice off the Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, May 
23, 2010, at WK9. 
 129. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 26–30. 
 130. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). 
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further grounds for disqualification, including a provision that will 
sometimes be triggered by retired Justices who serve on government 
panels or advisory bodies.131 It requires recusal when the Justice “has 
served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated 
as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or 
expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in 
controversy.”132 
Permitting retired Justices to serve on the Supreme Court as well 
as on lower federal courts would not, and should not, change the 
recusal standard with respect to particular cases. If a retired Justice 
has a financial or other conflict that would require recusal from a 
lower court case, it should require recusal from the Supreme Court 
itself.133 With respect to recusal in particular cases, we see no reason 
to distinguish active from retired Justices or service on the lower 
federal courts from service on the Supreme Court. One has reason to 
doubt the impartiality of a retired Justice with a financial interest in a 
case in exactly the same way one might doubt an active judge or 
Justice with such an interest, regardless of whether the judge or 
Justice is sitting on a lower federal court or on the Supreme Court. 
B. Retired Justices as Elder Statespersons 
Beyond the requirement of recusal in particular cases, retired 
Justices and, to the extent that they perform similar functions, lower 
court judges who have taken senior status,134 may face conflicts that 
current law discounts. The issue arises because retired Justices have 
sometimes taken on the role of “elder statespersons” by serving the 
country in a nonjudicial capacity. 
Consider Justice O’Connor’s service following her retirement on 
the Iraq Study Group, which produced analysis and concrete policy 
recommendations on military and foreign-policy matters that fall 
squarely within the purview of the political branches.135 We think that 
 131. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 135–143. 
 132. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3). 
 133. See id. § 455(b)(4) (providing recusal standards for Justices, judges, and magistrates 
based on financial interest). 
 134. For simplicity, the balance of this Part omits discussion of lower court judges who have 
taken senior status. 
 135. JAMES A. BAKER, III, LEE H. HAMILTON, LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER, VERNON E. 
JORDAN, JR., EDWARD MEESE III, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, LEON E. PANETTA, WILLIAM J. 
PERRY, CHARLES S. ROBB & ALAN K. SIMPSON, THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT (2006), 
available at http://www.usip.org/programs/initiatives/iraq-study-group. 
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her service on the Iraq Study Group was proper and should not have 
categorically disqualified her from continuing to serve in a judicial 
capacity on the lower courts or, if authorized by a statutory change, 
the Supreme Court.136 No doubt Congress named Justice O’Connor to 
the group because of her demonstrated wisdom and judgment during 
her distinguished career on the Court. But it is nonetheless 
noteworthy that this sort of activity could be considered 
inappropriate for an active Justice.137 
By way of comparison, Justice Fortas’s close relationship with 
President Lyndon Johnson—which apparently included consultation 
on the Vietnam War—was a factor in Fortas’s failure to secure 
confirmation to the Chief Justice’s seat and his eventual resignation 
from the Court.138 Those outcomes likely reflected a widespread 
perception that Fortas’s extrajudicial activities were inconsistent with 
his continuing service as a Justice. Likewise, although it did not come 
to light at the time, Chief Justice Vinson’s informal advice to 
President Truman regarding the legality of seizing the steel mills was 
also improper.139 
We do not mean to say that Justice O’Connor’s activities are 
indistinguishable from Justice Fortas’s or Chief Justice Vinson’s. On 
the contrary, O’Connor served openly on the Iraq Study Group, 
whereas Fortas and Vinson met with Presidents Johnson and Truman, 
respectively, in secret. Moreover, and more to the present point, 
O’Connor was retired when she served on the Iraq Study Group. 
Yet if a retired Justice is simply another judge or Justice as far as 
the ethical rules are concerned, does that mean that Justice O’Connor 
was wrong to serve on the Iraq Study Group after all? If not, did she 
thereby disqualify herself from hearing all cases by designation on a 
lower court and, in the event that something like the Leahy proposal 
were enacted, on the Supreme Court? 
 136. Justice Stevens agreed. See Telephone Interview with John Paul Stevens, supra note 7 
(commenting that he saw no reason for Justice O’Connor to keep her views on social and 
political issues private). 
 137. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.1, 3.4 (2007) (providing ethical rules 
regarding extrajudicial activities and the acceptance of appointments to governmental 
positions). 
 138. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 625 
(1987) (noting that Justice Fortas was widely known to be giving advice to President Johnson on 
Vietnam War issues and reelection strategy). 
 139. See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 897 (1992) (noting that Chief Justice Vinson 
confidentially advised President Truman, in violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine). 
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Part of the answer may be that there are only weak formal 
constraints on extrajudicial activities, even for active judges and 
Justices. Perhaps Justice O’Connor would have been within her rights 
to serve on the Iraq Study Group even had she not retired. Certainly, 
we can find historical precedents. Five Supreme Court Justices joined 
ten members of Congress to compose the electoral commission that 
resolved the contested election of 1876;140 Justice Jackson took a leave 
of absence from, but did not give up his seat on, the Supreme Court 
to serve as a Nuremberg prosecutor;141 Chief Justice Warren chaired 
the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President 
Kennedy, popularly known as the “Warren Commission”;142 and 
Justices and judges routinely serve on such bodies as the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission and the rules advisory committees.143 
Longstanding case law confirms the compatibility of such 
moonlighting with holding an Article III office. Consider Chief 
Justice Jay’s view in Hayburn’s Case.144 After determining that 
Congress could not constitutionally assign nonjudicial business to an 
Article III court, he and the two other judges with whom he was 
sitting nonetheless undertook the precise business assigned—
determining invalid veterans’ pension eligibility—“in the capacity of 
commissioners.”145 That decision—and the long history of subsequent 
performance of nonjudicial service by Article III judges and 
 140. See Jesse H. Choper, Why the Supreme Court Should Not Have Decided the Presidential 
Election of 2000, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 335, 341 n.30 (2001) (“Congress appointed an electoral 
commission composed of five Senators, five Representatives, and five Supreme Court 
Justices.”). 
 141. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William’s Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the Duty To 
Sit, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 813, 845 (2009). 
 142. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF 
PRESIDENT KENNEDY, at v (1964) (listing Chief Justice Warren as the commission’s chairman); 
see also Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or 
Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1137 (1994) (noting the controversy 
caused by Chief Justice Warren’s appointment as chairman of the commission). 
 143. Justice Breyer served as a member of the U.S. Sentencing Commission from 1985–1989 
when he was a judge on the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Biographies of Current 
Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/
about/biographies.aspx (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). For a list of current members of the federal 
rules advisory committees, see Committees of the Judicial Conference of the United States, U.S. 
COURTS (Oct. 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Committee_
Membership_Lists/2010_Committee_Members.pdf. 
 144. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). 
 145. Id. at 410 n.†. 
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Justices146—suggests that perhaps there would have been nothing 
objectionable about even a fully active Justice serving on a body 
charged with extricating the United States from a foreign war. 
Yet surely at some point there is a line beyond which one 
becomes categorically ineligible to serve as a judge or Justice. 
Suppose then-Justice Hughes had run for president without giving up 
his seat on the Court, or more fantastically still, that he had won, and 
then attempted to execute the offices of president and Supreme Court 
Justice simultaneously. 
There is some well-known precedent for even that degree of 
moonlighting, of course. As every first-year student of constitutional 
law learns when studying Marbury v. Madison,147 John Marshall 
retained his position as secretary of state for some time after his 
appointment to the Court as Chief Justice.148 The casebooks routinely 
ask whether Marshall ought to have recused himself in Marbury,149 to 
which the answer under modern recusal standards is almost certainly 
“yes.” But the broader question is whether—quite apart from a bias 
that may arise in any particular case—being a judge or Justice is 
inconsistent with some other jobs. 
The constitutional text is at best silent on this issue. Indeed, it 
could be said by negative implication to authorize concurrent judicial 
and executive service. Article I, section 6 bars members of Congress 
from simultaneously holding “any Office under the United States,”150 
a term that clearly encompasses judicial office. In thus barring a judge 
or Justice from also serving in Congress, the Constitution tacitly 
permits judges and Justices to hold positions in the executive branch. 
Nonetheless, principles of separation of powers should be 
understood to bar anyone from simultaneously holding office in the 
executive and judicial branches. Finding such a principle in the tacit 
postulates of the Constitution creates some textual embarrassment, to 
 146. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 402–03 (1989) (discussing cases 
relating to the legality of judges’ extrajudicial services); see also supra text accompanying notes 
135–143. 
 147. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 148. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (3d ed. 2009) (noting that 
John Marshall served as both secretary of state and Chief Justice from January 1801 to the end 
of John Adams’s presidency). 
 149. E.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES IN CONTEXT 96 (2008); 
FALLON ET AL., supra note 107, at 68; KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10 (16th ed. 2007). 
 150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
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be sure; it renders the Incompatibility Clause of Article I 
superfluous.151 But that is a relatively small price to pay to preserve a 
core structural feature of the Constitution—even if it is one that was 
violated by John Adams and the Federalist Congress that confirmed 
Chief Justice Marshall. 
Thus, we assume that there are constitutional limits on the ability 
of active judges and Justices to play other roles in government, even 
advisory ones. We do not find it necessary to say here where exactly 
those limits are, although service on something like the Iraq Study 
Group—given the assignment of the war powers to the political 
branches—probably comes close to the line. 
How do we reconcile that judgment with the judgment that 
Justice O’Connor was permitted to serve on the Iraq Study Group? 
Without attempting to define the boundaries precisely, we would say 
that the limits on the performance of nonjudicial tasks by retired 
Justices should be somewhat less strict than the limits for active 
Justices, in part because of the accumulated experience and wisdom 
reposed in the elite group of retired Justices and the service they 
could continue to offer the United States. The rules and standards 
governing permissible extrajudicial activities focus in substantial part 
on appearances, after all, and a vigorous schedule of moonlighting 
will typically appear worse when undertaken by an active judge or 
Justice than when undertaken by a retired one. 
To be sure, there are limits, even for retired Justices and senior 
judges. For example, suppose then-Justice Hughes had retired rather 
than resigned his seat as an Associate Justice before running for 
president, won, and then attempted to adjudicate cases by designation 
(assuming statutory authorization for doing so existed). Even if 
 151. Professor Seth Tillman argues that the Incompatibility Clause itself does not apply to 
the president, only to officers serving under the president, but Professor Steven Calabresi 
disagrees. Seth Barrett Tillman & Steven G. Calabresi, Debate, The Great Divorce: The Current 
Understanding of Separation of Powers and the Original Meaning of the Incompatibility Clause, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 134, 134 (2008), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/
GreatDivorce.pdf. If one were to agree with Tillman that the president is permitted to serve in 
Congress notwithstanding the Incompatibility Clause, then one would be very unlikely to find in 
the general principle of separation of powers a prohibition on joint executive/judicial 
officeholding. But we do not agree with Tillman, whose methodology neglects what Professor 
Charles Black called “structural” inferences from the document and, for the reasons given by 
Calabresi, appears to fail even on its own terms. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND 
RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11 (1969) (expounding the structural method, in 
which the relations among institutions created and recognized by the Constitution give rise to 
principles of constitutional law). 
DORF IN FINAL 10/6/2011  6:42:29 PM 
2011] COMING OFF THE BENCH 119 
 
President/Justice Hughes only heard cases in which the United States 
was not a party, we still think that this sort of arrangement would 
have violated the separation of powers, and we expect that most 
readers would share that view. 
Where is the line between serving on the Iraq Study Group—
permissible for a retired Justice, in our view—and serving as secretary 
of state or president—impermissible, in our view? The constitutional 
text, history, and case law provide insufficient materials to answer this 
question definitively. Our goal here is not to propound any particular 
answer but instead simply to suggest that some kinds of moonlighting 
that would be constitutionally impermissible if performed by active 
judges and Justices may be permissible if performed by retired 
Justices.152 
Why? Chiefly because a retired Justice, even if still part of the 
judiciary in some sense, is, after all, retired. No longer a central part of 
the business of the Court, retired Justices have a unique perspective, 
that of both insiders and outsiders. Given the vagueness of the 
separation-of-powers norm at issue, it would be a shame to deprive 
the nation of that perspective or to make ineligibility to serve on the 
Article III courts its price—if one thought that the Leahy proposal 
were otherwise justified. 
Of course, much of what retired Justices do when not hearing 
cases on the lower courts, or—should something like the Leahy 
proposal be adopted—on the Supreme Court, will be uncontroversial. 
They can undertake judicial-administration projects, serve on blue-
ribbon panels that address matters relating to the judiciary, and speak 
and write on public affairs. Such activities are clearly compatible with 
judicial office for active judges and Justices, thus leaving no doubt 
that they are also permissible for retired Justices. 
We do not suggest that there is some category of activities that 
retired Justices and judges may undertake that is currently forbidden 
to them. Our proposed modest relaxation of the restrictions on 
retired Justices’ activities is one of degree rather than of kind. It can 
perhaps be best illustrated by the example of the most prominent 
federal court of appeals judge of the modern era, Richard Posner. 
 152. We refer in the text to retired Justices who wish to remain eligible to serve by 
designation on the Supreme Court or on lower federal courts. Even the weak restrictions we 
identify here would be inapplicable to retired Justices who chose not to be available for such 
service, and, of course, nothing in this Article should be read to mean that we think retired 
Justices should be required to continue to serve. 
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Before ascending the bench, then-Professor Posner did not 
hesitate to tackle controversial issues in his scholarship,153 nor has he 
hesitated to do so since donning a judicial robe. While a judge on the 
Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner has written a book about sex in which 
he suggests that some unattractive women are lesbians because 
appearance is less important to women than to men,154 has written a 
critical evaluation of The 9/11 Commission Report155 that addressed 
matters of national-security policy that would ordinarily be thought 
far outside the ken of judicial competence,156 and has said that one of 
the most reviled decisions in the history of the United States, 
Korematsu v. United States,157 was “defensible.”158 
There is room for disagreement about the propriety of Judge 
Posner’s extrajudicial activities, but there would likely be agreement 
that he pushes the envelope for a sitting federal judge. That consensus 
partly reflects the provocative nature of some of what Judge Posner 
says, but it also partly reflects a judgment that a judge should not be a 
public intellectual. According to this view, judges ought not opine 
publicly at all about some topics, no matter how sensible or sober-
minded their substantive views on those topics. 
By contrast, a retired and well-respected judge or Justice, as an 
elder statesperson, is well situated to speak on judicial questions159 
and, more broadly, on issues of the day. Consider a 2010 essay that 
 153. See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby 
Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 342–46 (1978) (discussing the negative effects of the legal 
prohibition on selling babies). 
 154. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 123 (1994) (“[H]omely women should 
have relatively better lesbian than heterosexual opportunities because women tend to place less 
value on good looks in a sexual partner than men do.”). 
 155. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT (2004), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf. 
 156. Richard A. Posner, The 9/11 Report: A Dissent, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, § 7 (Book 
Review), at 1. 
 157. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 158. Pamela Karlan & Richard Posner, The Triumph of Expedience: How America Lost the 
Election to the Courts, HARPER’S MAG., May 2001, at 31, 39. The statement was Posner’s alone. 
Karlan, in dialogue with Posner, characterized the decision as “disastrous.” Id. at 37. 
 159. Recently, retired Justice Stevens made news by stating how he would have voted on 
cases decided by his erstwhile colleagues. See Adam Liptak, Justice Stevens Is off the Bench but 
Not Out of Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2011, at A14 (discussing a speech by Justice Stevens, 
in which the retired Justice explained how he would have voted on several Supreme Court 
decisions issued after his retirement). After Justice Powell retired, he announced that he had 
changed his mind about the constitutionality of the death penalty. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451–54 (1994). 
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Justice O’Connor coauthored for the New York Times.160 In it, she 
and her coauthors called on Congress to allocate $2 billion in funding 
for research on Alzheimer’s disease.161 Principles of separation of 
powers and judicial ethics could be invoked to call into question an 
active judge or Justice’s attempting to influence the quintessentially 
legislative power of the purse in this way—at least when the 
allocations sought have nothing to do with the legal system. And 
indeed, even though she was retired, Justice O’Connor was criticized 
on just this ground.162 But notwithstanding the fact that at the time 
she coauthored the essay Justice O’Connor was in some sense still “a 
serving federal judge,”163 in another sense, she was not. Given her 
extraordinarily high profile, her quite public struggle with her 
husband’s Alzheimer’s affliction—which occasioned her 
retirement164—and the fact that she had retired from active service on 
the Supreme Court, it oversimplifies matters to treat her as just 
another judge. If a case involving Alzheimer’s funding were to come 
before Justice O’Connor, whether sitting by designation on a lower 
federal court or, if the Leahy bill were to pass, on the Supreme Court, 
her past advocacy on the subject might require recusal, but the 
advocacy, standing alone, strikes us as appropriate in light of her 
status as a retired Justice. 
CONCLUSION 
The Leahy bill will not likely be enacted into law in the near 
future, and mostly for good reason. As discussed in Part III, even 
during a term in which Justice Kagan was recused in roughly one-
third of the Court’s cases, there was no dire need for retired Justices 
to serve as substitutes. Barring extraordinary circumstances, the 
Court will soon return to its customarily small number of recusals, 
rendering the bill even less necessary. 
 160. Sandra Day O’Connor, Stanley Prusiner & Ken Dychtwald, Op-Ed., The Age of 
Alzheimer’s, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2010, at A33. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Ed Whelan, Justice O’Connor on Alzheimer’s Funding, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Oct. 
28, 2010, 1:03 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/251347/justice-o-connor-
alzheimer-s-funding-ed-whelan (questioning Justice O’Connor’s activities urging the legislature 
to act). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Dennis Hevesi, John J. O’Connor III, 79, Husband of Ex-Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 
2009, at B19. 
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Moreover, even if a strong administrative case could be made for 
the Leahy bill, politics would likely stymie it. All of the currently 
retired Justices are, on average, more liberal than the Court’s current 
median Justice, Justice Kennedy. Accordingly, the majority-
Republican House of Representatives would be unlikely to support a 
measure that would, in the short run and on average, move the Court 
to the left in those cases in which it is salient. More broadly, in times 
of divided government, one party or the other would have reasons to 
oppose reactivating the retired Justices, on the ground that they 
would either be too liberal or too conservative. 
Nonetheless, the Leahy proposal warrants serious consideration 
because it reveals a great deal about the Supreme Court as an 
institution and about retired Justices. The evident constitutionality of 
the Leahy proposal—and of the far more radical proposals that it 
resembles in some important particulars—underscores just how 
minimally the Constitution constrains Congress in its ability to shape 
the federal courts. 
As for retired Justices themselves, they already do not ride 
quietly into the sunset, never to be heard from again. Retired Justices 
in the modern era typically remain active in public life, speaking out 
on important issues and calling upon the expertise that long judicial 
service confers. Balancing the roles of elder statesperson and part-
time judge or Justice can raise delicate questions of judicial ethics. 
Nevertheless, the operative legal principles should be interpreted 
broadly to permit retired Justices to serve in both capacities, lest the 
public be deprived of their perspective on policy matters or the courts 
be deprived of their contributions to the law. 
